McCartie v. The Queen (September 19, 2018 – 2018 TCC 185, Bocock J.).
Précis: The Appellant had been prosecuted for tax evasion. He and his co-accused wife were both acquitted. During the course of the criminal trial certain evidence was ruled inadmissible on the basis of Charter violations. The Appellant moved for a determination of certain questions pursuant to Rule 58(1) of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) (the Rules). Bocock J. dismissed his motion on the basis that the sorts of questions raised were better left to the trier of fact during the course of an actual trial. He awarded costs to the Respondent.
Decision: The decision basically followed well known precedent in dealing with Rule 58(1) applications:
 The proposed Rule 58 Questions submitted by Mr. McCartie are as follows:
a. What evidence was relied on for the assessment under appeal?
b. Was the “evidence” relied on for the assessments obtained in violation of the Appellant’s Charter rights?
c. If yes, should that evidence be excluded from this proceeding under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
d. If the evidence is excluded, is it appropriate and just in the circumstances for the assessments of tax relevant to this reference to be vacated by virtue of subsection 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
 For the reasons stated, the Court does not find that it appears that determining the Rule 58 Questions before trial would substantially shorten the proceedings or save costs.
 Moreover, even if it did, in the circumstances of the present case, the Court would decline to exercise its discretion to order the determination of the Rule 58 Questions. The Rule 58 Questions 1, 2, and 3, however answered, would require testimony before the motion judge which would most likely need be repeated before a trial judge. The prospects of two judges, after considerable testimony, opining on the credibility and weight of the same witnesses in the same appeals is neither fair, nor consistent to the parties nor the interests of justice. Given the breadth of the alleged impugned evidence, the trial judge should hear it, consider it and, if warranted, exclude it. This allows the full appreciation of the factual viewscape by the person ultimately assigned with the task of ruling on the correctness of the assessments.
 A properly established preliminary voir dire by a trial judge regarding the admissibility of this body of factual evidence is a more efficacious and efficient method of dealing with the exclusion of the impugned evidence. That decision is more proximate to the parties, the deciding trial judge and the ultimate outcome.
 The exclusion or admissibility of the impugned evidence also replicates the original criminal trial process. In that process, Judge Gouge, like the future trial judge of this Court, heard the challenges, decided the admissibility issue and proceeded to hear the trial and render judgement. In this motion judge’s opinion, that is the way these appeals should proceed before this Court.
Bocock J. dismissed his motion on the basis that the sorts of questions raised were better left to the trier of fact during the course of an actual trial. He awarded costs to the Respondent.
Note: Presumably the reference to Questions 1, 2 and 3 in para.  correspond with the reference to Questions a, b, and c in para. .