Hauser v. The Queen
(November 7, 2014 – 2014 TCC 328) was a very fact specific case involving the appellant’s claims for moving expenses.
 Trudy Hauser moved from Cochrane to Calgary around August 2012 in order to have a shorter commute to her new job. The issue to be decided is whether the move qualifies for the moving expense deduction in section 62 of the Income Tax Act. The moving expenses that are at issue are approximately $17,000.
 In order to qualify for a work-related moving expense deduction under s. 62 of the Act, the move must satisfy the requirements of an “eligible relocation” as that term is defined in subsection 248(1) of the Act. The relevant part of this definition is set out below:
“eligible relocation” means a relocation of a taxpayer in respect of which the following apply:
(d) the distance between the old residence and the new work location is not less than 40 kilometres greater than the distance between the new residence and the new work location;
 Paragraph (d) above requires that the new home be at least 40 kilometres closer to the new work location than the old home.
 The parties agree that the distance between the new home and the new work location is 15 kilometres.
 The dispute concerns the distance between the old home and the new work location. The Crown suggests that this distance is 40 kilometres and Ms. Hauser suggests that it is approximately 60 kilometres.
 The Crown submits that the distance should be measured by a major urban road that is about 40 kilometres. It is submitted that this is the shortest normal route. If this is the appropriate measure of distance, the new home is only 25 kilometres closer to the new work location.
The gist of the appellant’s argument was that construction delays required the use of a longer route and therefore entitled her to the expenses claimed.
The court was not persuaded by the appellant’s argument whether as a matter of legislative policy or common sense:
 A purposive approach to interpreting the term “distance” is required. Applying this approach, it is not appropriate in my view to stretch the term “distance” to disqualify routes that are under construction. Section 62 of the Act provides a deduction for moving expenses that generally would be expected to benefit the taxpayer over a number of years. In my view, it would distort the purpose of the legislation if a temporary construction project were to permit a longer route to be used.
 The remaining question is whether the delays on the urban route lasted such a length of time that they should be taken into account from a common sense perspective.
 Ms. Hauser provided documentary evidence that the delays on the urban road commenced in 2010 and at that time the construction was expected to be completed by November 2012. Ms. Hauser moved around August 2012.
 Ms. Hauser testified that the construction lasted longer than this. I accept that the construction lasted longer than expected, but I am not satisfied by the evidence that the delays and detours lasted so long that the urban route was not an appropriate route for purposes of section 62.
 I have concluded that the urban road is the appropriate route to measure distance for purposes of section 62. The appeal will be dismissed on this basis.