Blais v. Canada (February 6, 2020 – 2020 FCA 38, De Montigny (Author), Rennie, Locke JJ.A.).
Précis: Mr. Blais was unsuccessful in the Tax Court on his appeals of 2006, 2008 and 2009 (his 2007 appeal was quashed on consent since it was an appeal of a nil assessment). The Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Blais’ claim of allowable business investment losses and “eligible relocation” expenses since they did not fall within the four corners of the statute. It also rejected his wild claims of institutional bias because the judiciary was paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Thus the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Decision: Unfortunately for Mr. Blais his grounds of appeal were very shallow and the Court made short work of them:
 Pursuant to paragraph 39(1)(c) of the Act, a taxpayer must have disposed of property that was “a share of the capital stock of a small business corporation” or “a debt owing to the taxpayer by a Canadian-controlled private corporation” to qualify for a business investment loss. The appellant does not deny that he did not own shares in or lend money to a small business corporation, as he carries on his business as a sole proprietorship. As a result, the Tax Court did not err in finding that he could not deduct the losses on the tools he had to replace as allowable business investment losses. Nor could they be deducted as business expenses, not only because the appellant did not meet his burden of proving the amount of his expenses, but more importantly because paragraph 18(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act prohibits the deduction of capital assets such as tools.
 As for the appellant’s moving expenses, they could also not be deducted since they did not meet the definition of “eligible relocation” found in paragraph 248(1)(d) of the Act. The appellant testified that he moved only 3.8 kilometres from his house to the trailer on his jobsite, which is far less than 40 kilometres required by paragraph 248(1)(d) to qualify for “eligible relocation”. Accordingly, the Tax Court made no palpable and overriding error in finding that he could not deduct his moving expenses from his income under subsection 62(1) of the Act.
 Finally, the appellant also raised for the first time before us a number of arguments pertaining to institutional bias resulting from the fact that the judiciary is paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, and to alleged violations of his rights under sections 7, 11 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. It is well established that such arguments ought to be made and substantiated at the trial level, and will not otherwise be entertained on appeal especially if they have not even been brought up in the written submissions.
Thus the appeal was dismissed with costs.